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Book review
economists are concerned, the author maintains that in
measuring the impacts of a policy, they use approaches
they know to be wrong. The subtitle conveys a
partly correct impression. There are some 50 pages
on the definitions of allocative efficiency, and a
fair amount on relevance from a philosophical and
legal standpoint. One must look hard for anything
on prediction, or at least anything that a forecaster
would consider germane. The bulk of the book, a
chapter of almost 200 pages, is on the measurement of
allocative efficiency, particularly in the typical context
of second-best situations. Faced with an unavoidable
market failure in one part of the economy – for
example, a monopoly – should we attempt to attain
perfect competition in the rest of the economy – a next
best solution? We already have the answer: under the
general theory of the second best, achieving perfect
competition in the rest of the economy is not, in
general, the most desirable response to market failure.
The author finds two attitudes among economists:
those who know the theory of the second best but
choose to ignore it in their analyses, and those who do
not know the theory of the second best and don’t care.
The book is a manifesto to show both groups why they
should care and how they can amend their analyses.
And finding the second-best solution in a typical
economy with many market failures is both difficult
and time consuming. In the chapter, the author lays
out an approach for dealing with distortions caused by
market failure to arrive at a third-best solution, rather
than the impossible-to-achieve second-best solution.
That is, since the complete analysis takes too much
time and resources (like labor), make a judgment about
how much time and resources are worth devoting to
analyzing the effect of a policy, then calculate the
distortion-reducing impacts of the policy to the extent
that it is judged worthwhile — a partial analysis.
Truth or Economics: On the Definition, 
Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency, 
Richard S. Markovits. Yale University Press, New 
Haven (2008). x+507 pp.
The author introduces his monograph by noting 
in the first p aragraph t hat ( p. 1 ): “ This b ook i s a 
constructive critique of the way in which economists 
and law and economics scholars define, predict, 
and assess the moral and legal relevance of the 
impact of private choices or government policies 
on economic efficiency”. E fficiency of  an y kind 
is a slippery concept. What the author deals with 
is summarized in the concluding chapter (p. 421): 
“The book’s three parts respectively address the 
following three issues: the correct way to define 
the impact of a choice or policy on economic 
(allocative) efficiency, t he most-allocatively-efficient 
way to assess the allocative efficiency o f a  choice 
or policy, and the connection between allocative-
efficiency c onclusions a nd p rescriptive-moral and 
legal conclusions”. These two sentences, which are 
among the easier parts of this highly specialized 
book for a lay economist to grasp, serve to illustrate 
the dense, highly technical nature of the author’s 
arguments. Serious welfare economists are unlikely to 
find a better organized or more persuasive presentation 
on measuring the impact of a policy change on 
individual or group welfare. And only serious-minded 
welfare economists will persevere through all 436 
pages of text, containing many in-excess-of-fifty word 
compound-adjective sentences. (There are another 50 
pages of endnotes.)
The title of this book suggests a dichotomy: truth-
seekers and economists are two different animals. This 
is indeed the author’s intent. At least as far as welfare
these differences are too small to worry about. His
arguments include: small, but why not do it right?
Small, but in the context of a national policy this might
be $20 million to $30 million; small, but how can
you be sure it is as small as you say? There is no
quantitative example applied to a real-world situation.
That would be a good first step, though of course
it raises additional questions, such as, under what
conditions is the difference likely to be large enough
to matter? For that we await a latter-day Willig. But
first, the author must convince at least a handful of
economists to adopt his approach, and, as he makes
clear, he is at present a lonely pioneer.
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Most economists will readily accept the author’s 
fundamental contention, that the correct way of 
measuring welfare changes is through equivalent 
variation. Having got that far, most will probably 
fall back on the Willig (1976) defense. Willig argued 
that although consumers’ surplus, compensating and 
equivalent variation are all different values, for most 
practical situations the difference among them is 
small. He may not have said so explicitly, but 
his implication was that the errors in measuring 
variables, choosing an appropriate functional form 
and estimating parameters will matter more than the 
correct choice of welfare measure. Forecasters should 
readily appreciate Willig’s argument.
Markovits’ book, if incorrect in detail, is surely 
a methodological improvement. Concerning policy 
analysis, he provides numerous arguments as to why 
the standard Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, Scitovsky and 
potential Pareto measures of a welfare change are 
inadequate. He quotes seven or eight arguments used 
by economists for ignoring second-best considerations 
and provides several counters to each. With a lawyer’s 
skill, Markovits has marshaled his arguments as to 
what is wrong with current practice, why it is wrong 
and what needs to be changed. Does he convince me 
to persevere? No. The additional amount of work to 
analyze a policy seems high. How different will the 
results be in practice? We don’t know.
At one point (p. 70), the author admits that 
the difference between compensating and equivalent 
variation might be of the order of two to three percent, 
and attempts to rebut those who (like me) believe that
